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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
9 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
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11 JASON WAYNE CLARK,  
12 CDCR #J-07943,

13 Plaintiff,

14 vs.

15 D. WASHINGTON; B. HATFIELD;  
16 L. GARZA; A. GARCIA; S. CRUZ;  
17 T. CATLETT; P. CASTRO; D. CARR;  
18 J. JIMENEZ, JR.; G.J. JANDA;  
19 L.S. McEWEN; DIRECTOR OF  
20 CORRECTIONS,

21 Defendants.

Civil No. 10cv2171 BTM (WMc)

**ORDER:**

**(1) DENYING REQUEST FOR  
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL  
AND STAY; and**

**(2) DISMISSING FOR FAILING TO  
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE  
REMEDIES PURSUANT TO 42  
U.S.C. § 1997e**

22 **I.**

23 **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

24 Plaintiff, Jason Wayne Clark, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley  
25 State Prison and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
26 Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
27 § 1915(a), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel. On November 29, 2010, the Court granted  
28 Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP, denied his Motion to Appoint Counsel and sua sponte  
dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim. *See* Nov. 29, 2010 Order at 4-6. Plaintiff

1 has now filed his First Amended Complaint in which there contains a renewed request for  
 2 appointment of counsel and what appears to be a request for a stay while he exhausts his  
 3 administrative remedies.

## 4 **II.**

### 5 **REQUEST FOR COUNSEL**

6 The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however,  
 7 unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. *Lassiter v.*  
 8 *Dept. of Social Services*, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),  
 9 district courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may  
 10 be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” *Terrell v. Brewer*, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017  
 11 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the  
 12 ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se  
 13 in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and  
 14 both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” *Id.* (quoting *Wilborn v. Escalderon*,  
 15 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

16 The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice  
 17 nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. *Terrell*, 935 F.2d  
 18 at 1017.

## 19 **III.**

### 20 **REQUEST FOR STAY**

21 In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint he appears to seek a stay of the proceedings while  
 22 he completes the exhaustion of his administrative grievances. The Court cannot grant a stay as  
 23 Plaintiff must exhaust his available administrative remedies before he filed this action. The plain  
 24 language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no § 1983 action “shall be *brought* . . . until such  
 25 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added).  
 26 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in *McKinney v. Carey*, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002) holds that  
 27 prisoners who are incarcerated at the time they file a civil action which challenges the conditions  
 28 of their confinement are required to exhaust “all administrative remedies as are available” as a

1 mandatory precondition to suit. *See McKinney*, 311 F.3d at 1198. Section 1997e(a) “clearly  
 2 contemplates exhaustion *prior* to the commencement of the action as an indispensable  
 3 requirement. Exhaustion subsequent to the filing of the suit will not suffice.” *Id.* (quoting  
 4 *Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo*, 292 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2002)).

5 Here, Plaintiff has conceded that he has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies  
 6 prior to filing this action. *See* FAC at 6-7. A prisoner’s concession that he failed to exhaust  
 7 administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is a valid ground for dismissal. *See*  
 8 *Wyatt v. Terhune*, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s  
 9 action in its entirety for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  
 10 § 1997e. This dismissal is without prejudice to permit Plaintiff to refile a separate action upon  
 11 completion of the administrative grievance process.

#### 12 IV.

#### 13 CONCLUSION AND ORDER

14 Good cause appearing therefor, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

15 1. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel and stay of the proceedings is  
 16 **DENIED** without prejudice.


17 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that:

18 2. Plaintiff’s action is **DISMISSED** without prejudice for failing to exhaust his  
 19 administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

20 The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

21 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

22 DATED: May 19, 2011

23 

24 Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz  
 25 United States District Judge